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INTRODUCTION
Vehicle fleets operated by businesses and government agencies are a tantahzmg market for alternative fuel vehicles (AFVs) Wideseale use of AFVs m fleet apphcaUons could provide the critical mass necessary to mltmte development of a widespread refueling infrastructure and mass production of AFVS Purchase patterns and vehicle operating practlces haake fleets a favorite target for pohcymakers who wish to use AFVs as a means to reduce transportation emissions and petroleum consumption. Below are a few of the reasons why pohcymakers perceive fleets to be an attractive Initial market for alternatwe fuel vehicles"
. Fleet veh~ctes are, on average, driven twice as far as household vehicles on an annual basis (Federal Highway Admlmstratlon, 1992 , Mmuet al, I992, U. S. Department of Energy, 1993 Davis, 1995) . Therefore, the energy and en~ssions benefits of using an AFV are greater than tf a household vehicle were supplanted with the same AFV Furthermore, most fleet nuleage is typically accumulated m urban areas where ennssion reductions are most needed. Fleet vehicles constitute approximately one quarter of all hght-duty vehicle sales in the U.S. each year, even though they represent only 6% of all registered hght-duty vehicles (Mmu et al, 1992 , Boblt, 1997 . H~gh vehicle turnover facdltates rapid penetration of AFVs into the vehicle market. Fleets also prowde a condmt to the household vehicle market since most fleet vehicles are eventually sold to households A significant number of fleet vehicle purchases are by government agencies or regulated companies, which are polmcally more comphant than other market sectors Besides bemg accustomed to government rules and regulations, these organizations expect to play a key leadership role by demonstrating practical apphcations for AFVs Targeting fleets Is very efficient because relatively few decision makers control a &s-proportmnately large number of vehicles Less than 2% of fleets account for approximately 35% of all hght-duty fleet vehicles (Bobtt, 1997). Many fleet vehicles have fixed daily routes and are regularly fueled at a one location These operating parameters are conducive to using AFVs in the absence of a pubhc refuehng station network. Based on these facde observations, federal, state and local governments m the U S have adopted rules that require pubhc and private organizatmns to incorporate Iow-emlssmn alternatwe fuel vehicles into their fleets. The 1992 Energy Pohcy Act (EPAct) and the 1990 Clean bar Act Amendments (CAAA) both have provisions reqmnng fleets throughout the nation to purchase increasing number of alternative fuel or clean fuel vehicles over the next several years The CAAA Clean Fuel Fleet Program targets fleets of 10 or more vehicles in air quahty non-attainment areas while the EPAct Fleet Requirement Program--aimed at reducing petroleum consumptaon--affects fleets In 122 cities that operate at least 20 hght-duty vehicles (both laws apply only to veh~ctes that are 'capable of central refueling'). It has been estimated that these purchase requirements could put over I m11hon clean vehlcles m fleet applications by the year 2000 (U. S Environmental Protection Agency, 199I; Hu and Wang, 1996; Hu et aL, 1996, Vyas and Wang, 1996 , U S Department of Energy, 1997) In ad&tion to the federal requirements, 25 states have legMattve mandates or executive &rectlves reqmrmg the conversmn or purchase of alternative fuel vehicles for state government fleets Many U.S cities also have purchase requirements for their mumclpal fleets.
Several misconceptions regarding fleet behawor could dlmmish the effectiveness of AFV purchase mandates This paper explores these mlsconceptaons by exarninmg several ~mportant issues regarding the fleet market for AFVs These issues are structured around seven hypotheses which we test using data and information collected from focus group sessmns, one-on-one interviews with fleet operators, and a large two-part survey admxmstered to over 2700 Cahforma fleets, as well as other secondary sources (Nesbltt, 1996) 2 RESEARCH METHODS AND DATA COLLECTION Aggregate descriptive data for fleets are poor because fleets have no standardLzed reporting requirements, are haghly &verse, and not represented by any single trade organization Behavioral data, mchcatmg how and why fleets purchase and use velucles, is even more fragmented and unrehable In 1993, we undertook a 3-year study to improve our understanding of the purchase behavaor of hght-duty vehicle fleets wath respect to alternative fuels This paper examines broad misconceptmns we discovered, a subsequent paper will provide a detailed anMysls of fleet purchase and usage behavior First we conducted 39 one-on-one interviews and seven focus groups with 59 mdwlduals who played major roles in the fleet management and purchase decislons of thelr organizations They were speclficaUy recruited from a variety of orgamzations and management posmons. We had hypothesized, and it was confirmed in the interviews and focus groups, that most previous AFV fleet market studies were flawed in assuming that the fleet manager alone would make all decisions pertaining to the acquisition of alternative fuel vehicles. Because of the importance of such purchase declsmns, in terms of the number of people affected, the resources involved, and the precedents set, we found that several individuals from the same organization generally play substantive roles in the AFV purchase decision, especially in the initial purchases.
Interviewees and participants in the focus groups represented a wade cross-section of businesses, government agencies, utihty compames, and nonprofit organizataons Fleets vaned in s~ze, type, and function Small business fleets (less than I0 vehicles) are often ignored in fleet data and market studies, but were specifically included here since they account for an estimated 14% of all fleetoperated vehicles and are the fastest growang segment of the fleet populatmn (Energy Informatmn Administration, 1996a; Bob~t, 1997) . Interviews and focus groups were conducted m the Sacramento and Los Angeles regions, the two metropohtan areas in California most aggressively introducing AFVs into fleets. (V~deotapes of several other AFV fleet focus group sessmns conducted by the San Diego Gas and Electric Company were also reviewed.)
Building upon insights gamed in the focus groups and interviews, we helped design a two-part survey adtmmstered by the University of Cahforma, Irvme (Golob et al, 1997) . The first part of the survey comprised a computer-reded telephone interview (CATI) administered to 2715 orgamzatmns throughout Cahforma that operated at least l0 hght-duty vehicles Of these orgamzatlons, 2131 completed a follow-up mml questmnnaire that included detailed questions regarding the purchase and use of alternative fuel vehicles. Thls equates to a response rate of 78%, which is extraordinarily high for mall surveys administered to fleets Myths of alternative fuel vehicle demand by light-duty vehicle fleets
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Seven widely-accepted hypotheses regarding the near-term market for AFVs are specafied below We find them all to be largely mistaken--and thus myths. Rejection of the first four implies that the fleet market for AFVs has been overstated, while rejection of the latter three suggests that purchase decisions will be &fferent and possibly more posffave than otherwlse expected. The net effect is uncertain, except to indicate that a better understanding of fleet behavtor ~s needed in order to design and Implement effective public policy regarding the use of AFVs m fleet appheafions.
Hypothes~s 1 Refueling practtces reflect a fleet's abihty to use alternative fuel vehtcles
One of the most frequently cited rationales for targeting fleets Is that they often refuel thelr vehlctes at one location. Central refuehng could potentlaUy mitigate the 'clucken-or-egg' quandary of marketing AFVs before a fuels infrastructure is estabhshed. Pohcymakers commonly use central fueling as a proxy for a fleet's abihty to use AFVs. Most clean-fuel fleet mandates cover only fleet vehicles that are 'capable of central refuehng. ' In reality, the capacaty for central refuehng gaves httle re&cation of a fleet's abdlty to use AFVs In fact, central fuehng may signal a fleet's mabdlty to purchase certain types of alternatave fuel vehicles. Light-duty fleets that centrally refuel on-site typically do so because they have lugh travel demands and, therefore, cart slgnzficantly reduce fuel costs by purchasing petroleum in bulk. But high travel demands preclude the use of most AFVs, which have shorter ranges and hmzted refueling opportunities.
Moreover, of the fleets that do centrally refuel--34% of the business fleets and 78% of the pubhc fleets in our marl survey--few do so exclusively (Easton Consultants, 1991; Runzheimer International, 1993a,b,e; Energy Information Admlmstratlon, 1995 , 1996b . Of the organizations part~clpating m our focus groups and interviews, none had even one vehicle that was refueled at a single location 100% of the tune. Most fleets that centrally refuel rely on outslde sources for at least 15% of their refuehng needs (Easton Consultants, 1991 , Runzhetmer International, 1991 Even an occasional need to refuel off-site could render certain types of AFVs impractical for many fleets Therefore, nexther central refuehng nor average dady vehicle mileage are sufficient cnterxa for determining a fleet's abd~ty to use a de&cared AFV. Other factors need to b~ taken into cons~deratlon, such as whether or not the fleet velucles operate on fixed daily routes, whether another fleet vehtcle with a longer range can be substituted for occasional hagh male,age needs, and whether fleet operators would be wtlling to make those substitutions. Unfortunately, no such data are available.
Furthermore, it is not hkely that more fleets will adopt central refueling praclaees. Twenty-four percent of the fleets m our mail survey which currently do not have on-site refueling stated that it was not physically possible to install such facflmes, mainly because of space constraints. In fact, it was explaaned in our focus groups and interviews that many fleets let company employees drive vehicles home at night because available parking space is limited. Surveys show that well over half of all business fleets send at least some vehicles home with employees (Runzheimer International, 1993b , Energy Information Adrmnistration, 1995 The central refueling criterion specified m AFV fleet mandates may, in fact, expedite a growing trend away from central refuehng. Underground fuel storage tanks have decreased in number by almost 50% since 1989 due to U.S. Enwronmental Protection Agency regulations and habihty issues concerning fuel leakage (Wlegler, 1997) . These federal regulations require fleets to purchase insurance against tank leakage and take costly measures to protect against spdlage, overfill, and tank corrosion. The last of these measures goes into effect 22 December, 1998 at wtuch ttme fleets will have to decide whether to comply or remove their underground fuel tanks. Alternat~ve fuel vehtcle purchase mandates will ltkely expe&te tbas trend away from on-site central refuehng as fleets look for ways to c~rcumvent AFV purchase reqmrements by reducing the number of vehicles 'capable of central refuehng'. This strategy was brought up several times m our focus group sessions In fact, 9% of the fleets m our CATI survey had already removed their on-s~te refuehng facility
2 Hypothests 2 Fleets are better sutted to use AFVs because of m-house maintenance capabthtws
Although not stipulated by fleet mandates, m-house maintenance is another common argument for targeting fleets Indeed, a large share of fleets do perform their own maintenance and repairs 39% of the business fleets (with 10 + vehicles) and 78% of the local government fleets, in our mail survey. [Other stu&es find that state and federal government fleets are comparable to local fleets m performing m-house maintenance and repairs (Miau et al, 1992 , Runzheimer International, 1993a ]. It Is reasoned that these fleets are more capable of deahng w~th special AFV maintenance needs, and that vehicle downtime can be mmlmlzed because spare parts can be stockpiled for qmck repair and they need not depend on outsxde AFV repair services In fact, standar&za-tion--buymg all the same vehlcle model--is a common fleet strategy for reducing velucle downume and cost because parts can be anterchanged between vehacles and purchased and stocked in large quantataes for quack repairs However, hke central refuelmg, there is a trend away from m-house maintenance (Runzhelmer International, 1991Runzheimer International, 1993c ) This trend as due largely to better manufacturer warrantaes that have reduced the need for m-house serrates. Although only 10% of business fleets currently purchase extended warranties for gasohne vehicles (Runzheimer International, 1993c), 63% of our marl survey respondents felt such warranties would be 'very important' in the AFV purchase dectsion.
Fleet operators anticipate some vehlcle repair needs Only 14% of our marl survey respondents beheve compressed natural gas vehicles are as reliable as gasohne vehxcles and 38% beheve EVs are as rehable. But they are more concerned about the length of time the vehicle is out of semce They are looking to form a 'partnershtp' wtth AFV manufacturers and dealers m order to develop a strong AFV support network and minimtze downtime Emergency roadside service and free loaner vehacles during breakdowns are two examples of services fleet operators expect from dealers, manufacturers and leasing companies Even orgamzaUons with m-house maintenance facahtaes typically send thetr AFVs and specialty vehicles elsewhere to be ser~qced The primary functaon of most m-house service facihttes is to render routine maintenance and perform minor services In fact, only 23% of fleets with m-house facilities are currently authorized to do manufacturer warranty work (Runzhetmer International, 1993c) Repair work performed by uncertafied company mechanics can invalidate manufacturer warrant~es. We conclude that m-house maintenance capablht~es are not an zmportant motwat~on nor justification for introducing alternatwe fuels into fleets
Hypothests 3" Detatled cost accounting by fleets favors AFVs in purchase decisions
The pnncapal alternative fuels tend to have lower fuel costs and/or reduced maintenance, but higher vetucle purchase costs. Thus, the use of full life-cycle cost accounting, rather than simple vehicle purchase price comparisons, would tend to favor AFVs. It is widely beheved that fleet operators are more cognizant of the full life-cycle costs associated with owning and operating an automobde than are in&wdual buyers, and thus would be more accepting of AFVs than indiwdual consumers.
The presumption that fleets rationally conduct careful life-cycle cost analyses of new vehie|es appears overstated. The majority of fleet operators do not perform detailed cost comparisons when purchasing new vehacles and are not fully aware of life-cycle cost differences A survey by Runzheimer International found that only 24% of business fleets consider full hfe-cycle costs when selecting a new vehicle (the same number found to use computers to momtor automobile expenses) (Runzhelmer International, I993c), Some firms do keep detailed accounts that allow full life-cycle cost comparisons, but for the most part they are not carefully derived° Many fleets m our study did not understand the concept of full lYe-cycle cost analysis ('fuel costs are about the same for our vehicles') or &d not believe it apphes to them ('we do not keep vehicles long enough').
Instead, vehicle selection ~s often based on past experiences, w~th fleet operators sometimes being more brand-loyal than cost-conscious In a survey by Runzheimer International, past experience with a pa~cular vehicle make and model was ranked as the second 'most mfiuentmI factor m vehicle selection'----second only to capltal cost. Fleet operators we interviewed expressed an overwhelnung preference for AFVs produced by famdiar automobde manufacturers. One study summarizes the amportance of past experience m the following way (J D Power and Associates, 1989)" It is unlikely that personal experience will give way to detailed cost analyses w~th the advent of alternative fuel vehicles. In a fleet survey conducted by the Southern California Gas Company, only 24% of the respondents considered operating cost an important AFV purchase consideration (Southern California Gas Company, 1990) . In general, the three most important vehicle selection criteria are smtabdity (whether the vehicle can perform adequately in its intended apphcaUon), experience with vehicle (and/or manufacturer) and purchase price (J D. Power and Associates, 1989; Easton Consultants, 1991; Runzhelmer International, 1993b ,c, 1995 ; National Association of Fleet Administrators, 1997). The first two criteria are used primarily in fornung the final choice set. The final selection is then based largely on the purchase cost, wluch is usually the largest and easiest cost difference to assess amongst the vehicles in the final choice set.
Fleet operators in our focus groups and interviews that considered buying an AFV but eventually dismissed the notion, were discouraged by the high upfront capital cost. The higher purchase cost of an AFV tends to mask any potential sawngs resulting from lower operating costs In order for fleets to recognize the potential economic benefits of using AFVs vas-fi-~s conventional vehicles, the operating costs should be explicitly stated along side the purchase price.
The main cost concerns expressed by fleets in this study were not about vehicles or fuels, but uncertainties such as repairs (especially an terms of downtime) and the extra tame required to refuel (because of longer and more frequent refuehngs and the sparse network of fuehng stations). Fleet operators m our interviews and focus groups were concerned about the additional driver wages that would be needed as a result of increased refueling times, Fifty-four percent of our survey respondents indicated refueling time would be an important consideration when selecting an AFV ()ther studies have shown that the extra costs associated with AFV refueling can be significant and )s a primary concern among fleet operators (San Diego Gas and Electric Company, 1993 , Bech1old, 1997 , Smgh and Mmtz, 1997 .
In addition to cost, the inconvenience of refueling an AFV is also a concern for fleet operators, although it is difficult to assess. Participants in focus groups held by San Diego Gas and Electric Company indicated they would be willing to travel 3 miles to refuel but a more recent survey of federal fleets suggests a reluctance to travel more than 1/2 mile out of the way (National Renewable Energy Laboratory, 1997a,b) Fleets also expressed concerns about expenses associated with vehicle 'downtime' (the tame the vehicle is out of service because of scheduled or unscheduled repairs) Ttus was especially important to small fleets in our focus groups A vehicle breakdown could have a severe impact on the operations of a small business Although 86% of our meal survey respondents believe compressed imtural gas vehicles are less reliable than gasoline vehicles, fleets actually using these vehicles t~port no significant difference m total downtime compared to conventional vehicles (National Renewable Energy Laboratory, 1997a,b).
2r.4. Hypothesis 4 Fleet operators are well-informed about AFV technology, costs, mandatory purchase requirements, and incentive programs
Fleet operators are usually among the first to be adwsed of advances in automobile technology. They are kept apprised of changes through manufacturers, colleagues, trade associations, and industry journals It was hypothesized, therefore, that fleet operators would also be well reformed about alternative fuel vehicles, especially since they are the pnmary target for AFV sales. However, our findings indicate that in the mld-90s (well after many fleet rules were adopted), the majority Eeets were largely misinformed and m many cases uninformed about alternative fuel velucles.
Our focus groups and interviews revealed much confusion among fleet operators regarding AFV-related legislation and incentive programs, costs and availabdity of AFVs, and AFV technology, refueling and infrastructure needs. Even the most informed individuals had only fragmentary knowledge of alternative fuel vehicles. Decislonmakers within organizations receive only occasional bits of information about AFVs and from very few sources. As a result, they have limited knowledge of AFV issues and options Although 65% of our survey respondents had read or seen at least some reformation about alternative fuel vehicles in the previous 6 months, the K Nesbxtt and D Sperhng primary source of that reformation was newspapers and magazines One Cahforma utility company found that, even during an intense natural gas vehicle promotional campaign, 95% of the fleets m their service area had absolutely no knowledge about natural gas vehicles or were aware that there was a natural gas refueling station within 5 miles of their business (San Diego Gas and Electricity Company, 1993) The most respected sources of mformatmn are other fleet operators, which suggests m-use success stories are the best sales tool for AFV marketers An endorsement from another fleet operator is far more meamngful than anything read or seen m magazanes, newspapers, TV or trade journals On the other hand, negative feedback from fleets can be difficult to counter. Regardless of the number of success stones, fleets are most likely to remember the one bad occurrence that e~ther they experienced or heard about from another fleet operator Th~s fraternal relataonshlp among fleet operators ~s maintained through extensive personal networks, which allow news (as well as rumors) to travel qu~ckty Although AFV experiences vary considerably depending on the fleet and the fuel, overall reported saUsfaction could be Improved. One survey found that only 31% of the fleets wlth AFVs reported ha~rmg a posltave experience (Port, 1997), while another found that only 44% stated they would recommend an AFV to others (Natmnal Renewable Energy Laboratory, 1997a).
Fleets are more wdhng to purchase an AFV ff they are aware that such a ptirchase proved productwe for another fleet Fleets generally have a 'wmt and see' attltude hoping someone else wdl assume the nsk of being the first to adopt a new technology They are afraid a gnven vetucle or technology will emerge, achleve reasonable acceptance, lose momentum, and fade away. As one focus group member put it, fleets do not want to become "technology orphans'--stuck with obsolete vehlcles
Our findings also reveal that many fleets have unfounded safety concerns based on inaccurate mformataon Only 17% of our mml survey respondents believed that compressed natural gas vehlcles (CNGVs) were as safe as gasohne vehicles while 13% beheved EVs were as safe The primary CNGV safety concern was the notion that CNG tanks would explode ff ruptured m an accident (which is h~ghty unlikely). For electric vehicles the primary safety concerns were accidental electrocutmn and the danger of battery acid leakage m the case of a crash. Again, these concerns are mostly unwarranted (Corbus et al, 1993) The concerns were not deeply held, however For instance, focus group participants who had seen an mformatmnal video produced and distributed by the CNGV Cyhnder Company (located in Long Beach, CA) &d not have concerns about CNG tank integrity, and were qmck to reassure other focus group particxpants about the safety of the tanks In general, larger fleets, especially those with a full-t~me fleet manager, are better educated than smaller fleets on matters concerning AFVs Operators of large fleets generally have more extensive informatmn networks (e g, belong to more fleet assocmtaons), and therefore tend to be more knowledgeable about AFV developments, legislatmn, and purchase incentives. Full-tame fleet managers can remain aware of and respond to changes and opportunitaes in AFV development They are also targeted by promotmnal and educational campalgns conducted by utihty compames and AFV manufacturers However, there ts a &scernible trend toward ehmmatmg full-tame fleet manager posltlons as a means of reducing costs (Runzhelmer International, 1993c; Flesia, 1997) Moreover, fleet managers that are being hired are generally less experienced, over 75% of new fleet managers have no prior fleet experience (Flesia, 1997) The ~mphcations of less experience are unclear
Hypothests 5 Fleets will almost exclusively buy domesncaUy-produced alternative fuel vehtcles
Previous surveys have found that American fleet operators prefer domestic autornobdes (Natmnal Association Fleet Administrators, 1991 , Runzheimer Internattonal, 1993c . In a survey of U.S fleet operators, 89% of respondents sa~d they do not buy vehicles wtth traditaonally 'forelgn' nameplates; of these, 69% cited a °'perceived or written 'buy American' company pohcy" as the reason (Nataonal Assocmtmn of Fleet Administrators, I991) When asked in the same survey about thear velucle purchase mtentmns, less than 3% of the respondents planned to purchase any forelgn vehicles m the coming year S~mdarly, 65% of the business fleets surveyed by Runzhelmer Internatmnal stated they have a "defimte 'buy Arnenean' plan" (Runzheimer International, 1993c) Although generally true, there is some evidence that this 'buy American' sentiment is overstated and receding, and will prove less important in the AFV purchase decision. The percentage of imported hght-duty vehicles m U.S fleets has been slowly increasing and was about 15% in 1995 (Bobit, 1995) . In our mail survey 49% of the respondents felt it was important that their AFVs purchased from a U.S. manufacturer.
Many of the fleets in our study with formal or informal 'buy American' pohcles felt that foreignmade AFVs would be acceptable, especially in the absence of a comparable American product They felt that public interest concerns for clean air and energy security would justify the purchase of a foreign-made AFV. Moreover, fleet operators in tlus study suggested (accurately) that the meaning of 'Amencan-made' has lost sigmficanee. They gave examples of veluctes that are touted as American products even though most of the components are produced or assembled elsewhere
Hypothesis 6 AFV purchase decisions will be mfluenced by fleet mechamcs. Corollary Mechamcs will generally discourage the purchase and use of AFVs
We, as well as many others, have hypothesized that m-house mechamcs would be influential in AFV purchase decisions and that they would generally oppose such purchases. It was reasoned that mechanics would be reluctant to undergo the tralmng necessary to work on AFVs and would generally be reluctant to adopt unfamiliar technologies.
We found httle evidence to support this hypothesis. The fleet mechanics we interviewed were remarkably receptive to AFV purchases. Those who train AFV mechamcs reported to us similar findings Mechanics, regardless of age, background, and experience seemed to welcome new innovations, wewmg them as a means of getting ahead in their profession. As was pointed out to us by mechanics we lnterwewed, they are accustomed to change because technologies have become increasingly sophisticated m recent years. One company conducting training classes found that mechanics prefer to work on electric vehicles because there are fewer moving parts (that often get replaced instead of repaired), no oil changes, no exhaust systems, and no fumes in the work environment (Thideman, 1997) Even the mechanics m our study who were not receptive to AFVs indicated they would likely adapt rather than resist AFV purchases.
Regardless of their oplmons, It is unhkely that mechanics will be influential enough to affect imtial AFV purchase decisions As part of this overall fleet study, we found that the AFV purchase decision will be made relatively high in the orgamzational structure (Nesbltt, 1996) Decisionmakers may give consideration to the concerns of mechamcs when deciding which type of AFV to purchase, but mechanics by themselves rarely play a pivotal role in at least the first AFV purchase decision. However, it should be noted that mechames could be influential m succeeding AFV purchase decls~ons, especially if their ~mtial experiences are negative.
Hypothesis 7 Expectations of low resale value wdl discourage fleets from purchasing AFVs
Fleets tend to buy new vehlctes and replace them more quickly than individuals. Thus resale value plays a large role in the economics of fleet vehicle purchases. It is therefore widely believed that fleet operators will be disinclined to purchase AFVs unul a used vehicle market is established This hypothesis Is accurate for some fleets but Is not a valid generahzataon. Resale calculus is complex and sensitive to fleet practices and vehicle usage. Fleets with high vehicle replacement rates and those that dispose of vehicles on a regular basis, indeed do place great importance on projected resale value at the time of purchase Managers of these fleets seem to take considerable pride m reselhng vehicles at high prices One study participant even described lumself as a 'manufaeturer of used cars' At the other extreme are most public fleets. They generally keep vehicles longer and vehicle sales revenue is usually deposited m a general fund, rather than returned to the fleet. Consequently, pubhc fleets tend to be less concerned with resale value.
In our mail survey 44*,6 of the respondents felt it was "very important' that AFV resale value be comparable to a gasoline vehicle. However, there were no biases in responses between large and small fleets~ public and private fleets, or between fleets with low vebacle turnover rates and those wlth high turnover rates Resale value was not a major AFV purchase criterion for the majority of fleets in our focus groups and interviews. They were not overly concerned about AFV resale values because they did not expect to sell first-generation AFVs Instead, they intended to 'run them into the ground and then 'cannibalize them for parts'. This was true even for fleets with high vehicle turnover rates
The mare resale concern expressed by fleet operators m th~s study had to do with company reputations and potential hUgation Many fleets worried that their reputation within the used car market would be tarnished--that just a few unsatisfied customers could s~gnificantly impact future vehicle sales. Simdarly, legal concerns make fleet operators hesitant to sell AFVs to the public One fleet manager explained that he converts compressed natural gas vehicles back to gasohne before resale--at s~gmficant expense--m order to avoid potentml legal problems
IMAGE AND HIERARCHY TOWARDS A BETTER UNDERSTANDING OF BUSINESS FLEETS
In business fleets, imtml AFV purchases will likely be top-down decisions motivated largely by corporate ~mage benefits. Despite the fact that nearly all efforts to sell AFVs to fleets take place at the fleet level, AFV purchase decisions will generally be made at a much higher level within the organization, at least for the near term. In fact only about 15% of businesses allow the fleet manager to set fleet policy (Runzhelmer International, 1993c ) Ninety percent of our surveyed fleets indicated that AFV purchase decisions would be made at the upper management level and in 58% of those fleets the decision would likely be made by just one or two mdlvaduals Thas deelsmnmaking structure was also reported by fleet managers who had already invested an alternative fuel vehicles In each case, a high-level decismnmaker(s) m the orgamzation had conveyed a strong commitment to AFVs This commitment helped foster a positive atutude towards the AFV program, from those who serviced the vehicles to those who drove them These lugh-level decis~onmakers gave various reasons for purchasing an AFV but economic reasons were often not among them Instead, they expressed a desire to "help reduce mr poilutmn", "use domestic fuels" and "gave something back to the community" Such considerations were voiced by owners of small businesses as well as managers of large corporatmns (and government fleet managers) In a separate survey, fleet operators using or cons~denng using AFVs stated "envxronmental concerns", "corporate ~mage" and the desire to be a "good corporate c~t~-zen" among their top motivations (Port, 1997) In our lnter-v~ews, the most important and frequently cited inducements for purchasing an AFV were company linage enhancement and pubhc relations benefits
Company image--an amportant selection factor m purchases of conventmnal vehicles (Runzheimer International, 1991 , 1993b ; National Association of Fleet Admlmstrators, 1997)--~s especially sahent for AFVs It was one of the top purchase considerations expressed by the vast majority of our interviewees that had already purchased an AFV Overall, 71% of our survey respondents stated that amage benefits will be a "very important" AFV purchase consideration. As AFVs become more common, the purchase declsmn will hkely shde down the company hierarchy and ~mage enhancement will play a lessening role Economics and operating characteristics w111 hkely become the primary decision criteria
The first AFV fleet purchase declsmns will hkely be the outcome of an orgamzational decasionmaking process. Therefore, the AFV purchase deeislon should be viewed w~tlun an orgamzataonal context The lesson one draws as that, m addmon to targeting fleet managers (the person in charge of daily fleet act~wtaes), successful AFV marketing efforts should focus on key deelsmnmakers hlgher in the organizational structure Upper level management may have &fferent motivations for purchasing AFVs (e.g, corporate linage enhancement) than those at the lower levels.
EARLY ADOPTER FLEETS
The first fleets to purchase AFVs have mostly been government agencies and regulated utility companies (J D Power and Associates, 1989 , Southern Cahforma Gas Company, 1990 , San Diego Gas and Electric Company, 1993 , Daws, 1995 , Runzhelmer Internataonal, 1995 , Vyas and Wang, 1996 , National Association of Fleet Admimstrators, 1997 Wlegler, 1997) In our 1995 mall survey, 28% of the local government fleets already had purchased at least one AFV compared to 4% of the business fleets Moreover, 36% of the surveyed government fleets (government fleets constituted 19% of the total sample) are "likely to acqmre an AFV within the next year or two" compared to 9% of the business fleets Although not included in our survey, federal and state government fleets show samdar AFV purchase patterns and mtentmns due largely to execuuve orders and regulatory mandates (Mmuet al., 1992 , Runzhelmer International, 1993a , 1995 Hu and Wang, 1996, U S. Department of Energy, 1997; Nattonal Renewable Energy Laboratory, 1997a ,b, Port, 1997 In an effort to promote the development of AFV markets, electric and natural gas utthty compames have also been leaders m purchasing AFVs Twenty-six percent of the energy utlhty compames in our survey operated AFVs and 24% expected to purchase additional AFVs within the next 2 years Government fleets and utihty compames are expected to continue purchasing AFVs at an increasing rate because of rules already adopted as part of the Energy Pohcy Act of 1992 and the Clean Air Act Amendments of 1990, as well as various state and local rules. Another reason government agenczes and regulated utthtles are more inchned to purchase AFVs s pubhc scrutiny Government agencies participating m our focus groups sesslons and interviews felt that their high profile made it their responsibihty to 'set an example' or be 'pioneers' in the fight against air pollution, global warming, and rehance on energy imports Government fleet operators, though sensltwe about spending pubhc moneys, often feel that AFVs merit addatlonal expenditures Regulated energy utihty compames (espectally natural gas and electricity) exhibit simdar behavmr and are subject to similar government mandates, plus they are motivated by the desire to create new markets for natural gas and electnctty Government agencies and utfltty companies play a wtal role m dlssemmatmg AFV mformatmn within the fleet sector.
Large companies with high profiles, especially those that conduct business with the government, are also more hkely to purchase AFVs In general, these compames are the first to comply w~th regulatory requirements (Pfeffer and Salanclk, 1978) . In the specafic case of AFVs, several factors are key. In add~tmn to potentml corporate image benefits and access to more and better mformatmn (including first-hand accounts from other fleet managers), large corporations are better suited than smaller ones to assume the financml risks assoctated with investments in nascent technologaes Thelr larger fleets are also generally more amenable to substltutmg vehicles wlth different attributes for specific tasks Of the fleets m our survey 'likely to acqmre' an AFV an the next year or two, 32% were large orgamzatmns (over 500 employees) and 50% were government agenctes.
POLICY IMPLICATIONS AND LESSONS
Available knowledge about vehicle fleets is insuttic~ent for producing rehable estimates of the near-term AFV fleet market. Studies attempting to assess the potential fleet market for AFVs have focused on mappmg AFV attributes to fleet travel demand and operating needs (Wagner, 1979 1980 , Berg, 1985 Wachs and Levin, 1985 , Mader et aL, 1988 , ETFUCTI, 1990 , Marshrnent, 1991 , Cahfornta Energy Comnussmn, 1992 , Runzhetmer Internatmnal, 1993b , Energy Informatmn Admmistratmn, 1995 , 1996a CALSTART, 1996, National Renewable Energy Laboratory, t997b) , forecasting AFV market size based on regulatory requirements (U S. Environmental Protectmn Agency, 1991 , Hu and Wang, 1996 , Hu et aL, 1996 Vyas and Wang, 1996 ; U. S. Department of Energy, 1997), and predicting AFV market penetration rates based on fleet purdaase patterns and stated preferences (J. D. Power and Associates, 1989, Southern California Gas Company, 1990; Easton Consultants, 1991, San Diego Gas and Electric Company, 1993; Runzheimer Internattonal, 1995; Golob et al, 1997) . Although necessary and useful, these studies generally have many shortcomings, including incomplete sampling frames, low response rates, failure to identify key decxsion makers, poor grasp of orgamzatmnaI decision malang behavmr, and poor understanding of purchase behavmr of new products and attributes Furthermore, they provide htfle insight regarding which fleets will actually purchase AFVs, under what eondtUons they will purchase AFVs, and for what reasons.
The findings reported here suggest that AFV regulaUons are difficult to implement largely because of the diverse nature of the fleets The only commonahty is that they operate vehicles they do not make the same product, provide the same servxce, or even operate their vehicles m the same manner. As a result, proposed and adopted AFV implementatmn strategies may produce unexpected and, m some eases, undesired outcomes One such outcome is the hkehhood that AFV fleet rules will expedite the removal of on-site fuel storage facdiues (probably reducing toxic leakage but possibly increasing em~ssmns and energy use through increased travel to off-site fueling faciht~es). Furthermore, AFV fleet regulatmns do not prowde mcentwe to use AFVs that have already been purchased (e.g., a fleet that purchases a bt-fuel AFV for image benefits might operate it using only gasoline) 268 K Nesbttt and D Sperhng Given fleet diversity and our rather poor understanding of fleet decision making, It seems desirable that pubhc policy alined at accelerating fleet adoption of AFVs should tilt more toward flexiblhty, market instruments, and assuring posltlve experiences Where regulatory mandates apply, marketable credits might be seriously considered. A better understanding of fleet behavior wilt go a long way m helping formulate more effective AFV implementation strategies.
